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Protection, the Right to Travel, and National Security: Passports in the Commonwealth 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A number of countries have in recent years been forced to confront the problem of ‘foreign 
fighters’: individuals who have travelled from those countries to take part in conflicts in (most 
often) Syria and Iraq and who, if and when they return to their home state, pose a threat to 
people and property there.1 The preferred response of these home states has often been to 
deprive such people of their citizenship and so their right to enter (and return) to the country 
they left. 2 Where a state – for one of any number of reasons of domestic or international law – 
cannot withdraw the citizenship of a person it considers to represent a threat to national security 
or analogous public interests, it will often choose instead to withdraw the person’s passport (or 
refuse to issue one in the first place), preventing the person from exercising certain of the rights 
associated with citizenship and so minimising or containing the threat posed by him or her.3 The 
modern national security context therefore justifies, even demands, a re-examination of certain 
fundamental legal issues around passports. 
 
 The traditional conception of a passport at (English) common law reflected the 
protection owed to the holder of a passport by the state that issues it, and the request – which a 
passport explicitly makes – that other states extend that same protection.4 Over time, protection 
has faded from the legal picture, but has not been clearly replaced by any other concept. The 
most influential modern accounts in fact emphasise the legal insignificance of passports, 
portraying them as mere administrative documents which facilitate the exercise of rights but do 
not themselves confer those rights. This claim is at odds with the logic which underpins the use 
of passports as a tool of national security. Such use relies on the fact that passports – the primary 
                                                     
1 For an overview of the phenomenon in the context of the European Union in particular, see Bérénice 
Boutin et al, The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union Profiles, Threats & Policies, International 
Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper (April 2016). 
2 On which see Sangeetha Pillai and George Williams, ‘Twenty-First Century Banishment: Citizenship 
Stripping in Common Law Nations’ (2017) 66 ICLQ 521. 
3 An alternative, more optimistic, explanation is that the states in question recognise it as ‘a more human, 
large-scale, and temporary measure’: Leslie Esbrook, ‘Citizenship Unmoored: Expatriation as a Counter-
Terrorism Tool’ (2016) 37 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1273, 1313. Though this 
seems unlikely, it is true that the temporary nature of passport revocation is a key point of distinction, 
while the consequences – no matter how serious – are certainly less severe than those of the deprivation 
of citizenship, which severs all legal connection between the state and the individual so deprived. 
4 For a consideration of this fact which starts from the concept of protection itself, see Lauren Benton 
and Adam Clulow, ‘Introduction: The Long, Strange History of Protection’, in Lauren Benton, Adam 
Clulow, Bain Attwood (eds), Protection and Empire: A Global History, Cambridge University Press (2017). 
(and sometimes sole) method by which one proves one’s identity and nationality in the modern 
world – are intimately connected to the exercise of rights which one possesses by virtue of one’s 
nationality. Amongst these ranks most prominently what I call here the ‘right to travel’ – to enter 
and exit the country of one’s nationality. This article, on the basis of a consideration of the law 
relating to the use of passports as a tool of national security in the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, challenges the common law conception of passports, showing 
instead that passports effectively confer rights and so their refusal or withdrawal represents a 
denial of rights. From this conclusion a number of point flow. Though the significance is 
greatest for those states – the UK and Canada – in which passports are regulated under the 
prerogative power, there are implications also for those states – Australia and New Zealand – in 
which passports have a statutory basis.  
 
2. Passports, protection, and the fracture of citizenship 
 
Older accounts of passports in English law were closely tied to questions about to when it was 
and was not permitted for subject to leave the realm – a point on which there is a lack of 
certainty in the literature5 – as well as the distinction between subjects on one hand and, on the 
other, aliens. Chitty focussed upon the latter, treating passports as an aspect of the Crown’s 
powers in relation to war, and – specifically – the power of the King to take measures to ‘prevent 
the egress or ingress of his enemies out of or into his Majesty’s dominions’.6 To such measures, 
passports were in effect an exception: the King might permit his enemies ‘to come into the 
country without molestation, by granting to him letters of safe-conduct.7 The same point had 
been made much by Blackstone, who emphasised that friendly aliens – subjects of states with 
which the Crown was not at war – might enter the realm without permission, but that this was 
not true of enemy aliens: 
 
[N]o subject of a nation at war with us can, by the law of nations, come into this realm, 
nor can travel himself upon the high seas, or send his goods and merchandize from one 
                                                     
5 See Daniel Turack, ‘Early English Restrictions to Travel’ in CH Alexandrowicz (ed) Grotian Society Papers 
1968: Studies in the History of the Law of Nations (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) and ‘Freedom of 
Movement: The Right of a United Kingdom Citizen to Leave His Country’ (1970) 31 Ohio State Law 
Journal 247, as well as David W Williams, ‘British Passports and the Right to Travel’ (1974) ICLQ 642, 
646. 
6 J Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown: And the Relative Duties and Rights of the Subject 
(London, J Butterworth & Son, 1820) 48. 
7 Chitty (n 6) 48. 
place to another, without danger of being seized by our subjects, unless he has letters of 
safe-conduct.8 
 
Chitty, writing in the early nineteenth century, noted that the practice of giving letters of safe 
conduct was giving way to the issuance of ‘passports under the King’s sign manual or licenses 
from his ambassador’.9 Some accounts of the difference between the two distinguish them 
exactly along the lines Blackstone suggests: passports were given to friends; safe conducts to 
enemies.10  
 
Centuries before Chitty wrote, the status of subjects had been assessed authoritatively by 
Coke CJ in Calvin’s Case. He emphasised the reciprocal nature of the duties owed by Crown and 
subject: ‘ligeance is the mutual bond and obligation between the King and his subjects, whereby 
subjects are called his liege subjects, because they are bound to obey and serve him; arid he is 
called their liege lord, because he should maintain and defend them.’11 The status of aliens was 
and is different. When war is declared under the king’s prerogative, aliens of the states with 
whom the Crown was at war become enemy aliens,12 deprived of access to the courts,13 their 
property liable to confiscation and they themselves to detention and deportation.14 Aliens present 
in the realm who were subjects of friendly states, on the other hand, owed a ‘local allegiance’ to 
the Crown – an allegiance, said Blackstone, which ‘ceases the instant such stranger transfers 
himself from this kingdom to another’.15 The various powers to which enemy aliens were subject 
were unavailable as against those in local allegiance, and though in the United Kingdom the 
Immigration Act 1971 preserves the prerogative as regards aliens generally,16 it appears that there 
                                                     
8 Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 251 
9 Chitty (n 6) 48-9. 
10 Wyndham Beawes, Lex Mercatoria Rediviva OR, THE MERCHANT’S DIRECTORY, Peter Wilson 
(1754) 209. 
11 Calvin’s Case (1608) Co Rep 1a, 5a. 
12 See R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [53]. 
13 See, eg, Amin v Brown [2005] EWHC 1670 (Ch).  
14 See R v Vine Street Police Station Superintendent, ex parte Liebmann [1916] 1 KB 268 and, later, R v Bottrill, ex 
parte Kuechenmeister [1947] KB 41. The status of enemy aliens is discussed most fully in Arnold McNair, The 
Legal Effects of War, 3rd ed, Cambridge University Press (1948). 
15 Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 370. A resident friendly alien is ‘a subject by local allegiance with a subject’s 
rights and obligations’. Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262, 276. ‘Allegiance is owed to their sovereign Lord 
the King by his natural born subjects; so it is by those who, being aliens, become his subjects by 
denization or naturalization… so it is by those who, being aliens, reside within the King’s realm.’ Joyce v 
DPP [1946] AC 347, 366. Salmond said that subject was a wider category than citizen, distinguishing 
natural from alien subjects: ‘In English law, subjects, whether natural or alien, are those who owe 
allegiance to the Crown’ John W Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance (1902) 18 LQR 49, 50. The former 
owed ‘permanent and personal’ allegiance to the Crown, the latter ‘temporary and local’. 
16 Immigration Act 1971, s 33(5). 
no longer exists any prerogative power as regards friendly aliens.17 The basic distinction between 
subjects and aliens, friendly and enemy, nevertheless holds true in English law today – and has 
been suggested as a basis for the distinction between those against whom the doctrine of Crown 
act of state may and may not be pleaded18 – but has mostly lost its practical significance as the 
practice of declaring war (and so of moving persons, at a stroke, from the category of friendly to 
enemy alien) has faded.19 In the middle of the nineteenth century,20 reforms to British passports 
saw them taken on many of their modern features, including being issued ‘only to British 
subjects, or to such foreigners as may have been naturalized by Act of Parliament or received 
Letters of Denization’.21 At this time, there were no barriers to entry to the United Kingdom: the 
modern system of immigration control was introduced only by the Aliens Act 1905.22 
 
For much of the twentieth century, the leading judicial treatment of the British passport 
was found in a decision of the King’s Bench Division from around the same time. The case 
related to the charge against two individuals – including the left-wing journalist Henry Brailsford 
– of conspiracy to obtain a passport by false representations. There, it was said by the court that 
a passport ‘is a document issued in the name of the Sovereign on the responsibility of a Minister 
of the Crown to a named individual, intended to be presented to the Governments of foreign 
nations and to be used for that individual’s protection as a British subject in foreign countries, 
and it depends for its validity upon the fact that the Foreign Office in an official document 
vouches the respectability of the person named.’23 These dicta demonstrate the centrality, still in 
the early twentieth century, of the concept of protection to the understanding of what a passport 
was, and what it did. The text contained in every British passport – whereby ‘Her Britannic 
Majesty’s Secretary of State Requests and requires in the Name of Her Majesty all those whom it 
                                                     
17 See Christopher Vincenzi, ‘Extra-statutory ministerial discretion in immigration law’ [1992] PL 300 and 
Ian MacDonald, ‘Rights of settlement and the prerogative in the UK - a historical perspective’ (2013) 
JIANL 10. 
18 See, most importantly, Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC, though the point has never been authoritatively 
determined. Standard authority for the proposition that Crown act of state is not available as against 
British subjects is Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Trials 1029: see the discussion in Paul F Scott, The 
National Security Constitution, Hart Publishing (2018), 270-3.  
19 See Amin v Brown [2005] EWHC 1670 (Ch), holding that the objective existence of hostilities is 
unrelated to the question of whether a state of war exists under the prerogative, as well as the discussion 
in Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [53]. 
20 Martin Anderson, ‘Tourism and the Development of the Modern British Passport, 1814–1858’ (2010) 
49 The Journal of British Studies 258, 262. 
21 Correspondence respecting passports, 2356 (1857-58), 1-2. 
22 Largely in response to Jewish immigration from the Russian Empire at the end of the previous century: 
B Gainer, The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905 (London, Heinemann, 1972). Restrictions 
had been introduced in the later eighteenth century but later repealed: V Bevan, The Development of British 
Immigration Law, Croom Helm (1986) 58-64. 
23 R v Brailsford [1905] 2 KB 730, 745. 
may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance, and to afford the bearer 
such assistance and protection as may be necessary’ – continues to reflect these dual 
relationships: one on the domestic plane, between the Crown and subject,24 the other on the 
international plane, between the Crown and its counterparts. 
 
The notion of a passport as encapsulating the correlative relationship between allegiance 
and protection reached its zenith in Joyce v DPP,25 decided by the House of Lords shortly 
following the conclusion of the Second World War. Joyce – better known as Lord Haw-Haw – 
had been charged with treason, an offence whose core is the betrayal of an allegiance owed to 
the Crown. Joyce, however, was not a British citizen but an American one, and so – on the 
traditional conception – owed no allegiance to the Crown while outside its realms. Nor, for the 
same reason, did the Crown owe him protection. The complicating factor here was Joyce’s 
possession of a British passport, acquired under false pretences. It was held by the House of 
Lords that by possessing that passport Joyce was holding himself out as someone entitled to the 
protection of the Crown and so he owed it – notwithstanding the underlying factual reality – an 
allegiance which made it possible for him to commit treason. Harking back to Brailsford, Lord 
Jowitt distinguished between the effect of the possession of a passport by a subject and a non-
subject. Of the former, he said that though ‘the possession of a passport by a British subject 
does not increase the sovereign’s duty of protection’ it will ‘make his path easier.’ For a subject, 
therefore, it ‘serves as a voucher and means of identification.’26 On the other hand, ‘the 
possession of a passport by one who is not a British subject gives him rights and imposes upon 
the sovereign obligations which would otherwise not be given or imposed’: 
 
It is immaterial that he has obtained it by misrepresentation and that he is not in law a 
British subject. By the possession of that document he is enabled to obtain in a foreign 
country the protection extended to British subjects.27 
 
He added: 
 
To me, my Lords, it appears that the Crown in issuing a passport is assuming an onerous 
burden, and the holder of the passport is acquiring substantial privileges… Armed with 
                                                     
24 That is, some non-citizen subjects and non-citizen nationals continue to enjoy the right to a British 
passport: examples include British Overseas Territories Citizens and British Overseas Citizens. 
25 Joyce v DPP [1946] AC 347. 
26 [1946] AC 347, 369 
27 [1946] AC 347, 369-70. 
that document the holder may demand from the State’s representatives abroad and from 
the officials of foreign governments that he be treated as a British subject, and even in 
the territory of a hostile state may claim the intervention of the protecting power.28 
 
The decision in Joyce was heavily criticised at the time,29 and no reliance should be placed upon it. 
Crucially, where issues relating to allegiance and protection (which reveals itself to be a very thin 
duty owed to the citizen)30 have been litigated in modern times, the crucial factor has always been 
taken to be citizenship, rather than possession of a passport.31 This view is strengthened by the 
decision in Pham,32 where it was held that it could be ‘conducive to the public good’ to deprive a 
person of citizenship on the basis of his past activities, notwithstanding that he – by virtue of his 
imprisonment abroad – posed no current threat. The relevant legal standard, the Court of 
Appeal held, might be satisfied in a number of ways, including where the Crown concluded that 
it ‘should not have to provide protection to a person who has in the past so fundamentally 
repudiated the obligations which he owes as a citizen.’33 Protection is now unambiguously a 
function of citizenship, to which the possession of a passport seems to add nothing of (legal) 
relevance.34 This approach is clearly preferable. It explains why, in seeking to deal with those of 
its nationals who pose a threat to national security, the various states’ preference is usually to 
deprive them of citizenship, extricating itself from the legal relationships that subsists between 
citizen and state. 
 
The question is therefore what, if anything, replaces protection as the legal significance of 
passports?  The most important analysis of the passport in English law in the second half of the 
twentieth century – that of William Wade – is striking in its claim that the gap left by the concept 
of protection need not (indeed, cannot) be filled by any other legal claim. Passports, said Wade, 
have ‘no status or legal effect at common law whatever’; a passport is ‘simply an administrative 
document’ which ‘does not have the slightest effect upon [the individual’s] legal rights, whatever 
they may be, to go abroad and return’.35 Wade’s explicit reference to the common law makes it 
                                                     
28 [1946] AC 347, 370-1. 
29 Glanville Williams, ‘The Correlation of Allegiance and Protection’ (1948) 10 CLJ 5.  
30 See Colin RG Murray, ‘In the shadow of Lord Haw Haw: Guantanamo Bay, diplomatic protection and 
allegiance’ [2011] PL 115, discussing the modern case law on protection. 
31 See, for example, R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 
1598, in which it is clear the citizenship is the operative factor.  
32 Pham v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 2064 
33 [2018] EWCA Civ 2064, [52]. 
34 The practical dimension may be different: Lord Goldsmith QC, Citizenship: Our Common Bond (2008), 
[36]. 
35 HWR Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals, rev ed, Stevens & Sons (1989), 63-4.  
necessary to consider what – if any – amendment must be made to this claim in light of the 
statutory regulation. The answer is dual-pronged. The Immigration Act 1971 is framed so as to 
ensure that passports are not, as a matter of law, a sine qua non of the right to travel (and so, 
strictly speaking, Wade’s claim holds). In practice, however, they are essential to the individual’s 
exercise of the right to enter and leave the country. Section 2 provides that all British citizens 
have the right of abode in the United Kingdom; those who possess such right ‘shall be free to 
live in, and to come and go into and from, the United Kingdom without let or hindrance except 
such as may be required under and in accordance with this Act to enable their right to be 
established or as may be otherwise lawfully imposed on any person.’ The caveat is unpacked in a 
schedule to the legislation, which provides (in relation both to those arriving in and departing 
from the UK) that an immigration officer may require the production of ‘either a valid passport 
with photograph or some other document satisfactorily establishing his identity and nationality 
or citizenship’.36 The effect of this provision is that a person who wishes to exercise the rights 
consequent upon their right of abode may – notwithstanding its technical legal insignificance – 
be required to produce a passport: there is no requirement that any immigration officer to accept 
any alternative documentation,37 and even such documentation is accepted, it will likely not be 
accepted by the carrier who must transport the person into or out of the country. In practice, 
therefore, the distinction between passports as conferring rights and passports as facilitating the 
exercise of rights breaks down. A person who as a matter of law unambiguously possesses the 
right of abode will find it almost impossible to leave or enter the country without a passport.38 
 
The key developments discussed above predate the emergence of separate citizenships in 
the Commonwealth. This occurred in the post-war years, when the Dominions’ decision to 
legislate for their own citizenships prompted the development of a Commonwealth-wide 
                                                     
36 Immigration Act 1971, schedule 4, para 4(2). 
37 See the example of the journalist Iain Colvin who – in 1968, and so under a prior but analogous legal 
regime – sought to board a plane at London Airport without a passport but was refused leave to do so by 
the Chief Immigration Officer on the basis that none of the alternative documentation he offered was 
sufficient to establish his right his possession of the relevant rights: See the account in JUSTICE, Going 
Abroad – A Report on Passports, Barry Rose Publishers (1974) [6]-[7]. Asked about the matter, the Home 
Secretary explained that ‘Mr. Colvin is… well known as a journalist, but none of the documents of 
identity he produced technically satisfied the Immigration Officer that he is a British subject or a person 
to whom leave to embark… should be granted, and in the spirit of a test case leave was refused’: HC Deb 
23 May 1968, vol 765 c119W. 
38 The relationship between a passport and the right to enter the country were strengthened by an 
amendment made by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, providing a person ‘seeking to 
enter the United Kingdom and claiming to have the right of abode there shall prove it by means of’ either 
‘a United Kingdom passport describing him as a British citizen’ or ‘a United Kingdom passport 
describing him as a British subject with the right of abode in the United Kingdom’: Immigration Act 
1971, s 3(9). 
approach.39 Now, citizenship of the relevant dominion would be shared with the status of British 
subject, a status also then enjoyed by citizens of the United Kingdom.40 But the grant of 
passports by the Dominions had in some cases begun earlier – mostly in and around the First 
World War, as barriers to international movement were erected, in many cases for the first time. 
These temporary barriers were made permanent after the end of hostilities, and with them the 
question of travel becomes central to the nature and effect of passports. In most cases, 
Dominion passports were, for at least some period after their introduction, available to British 
subjects generally, rather than merely to citizens of the relevant Dominion, so that – for instance 
– in Australia, British subjects continued to be entitled to Australian passports for most of the 
twentieth century.41 These separate regimes have facilitated a considerable degree of legal 
divergence: there is now a fundamental distinction between those states in which passports 
continue to be regulated on a prerogative basis (the United Kingdom and Canada), and those in 
which the relevant law is statutory (Australia and New Zealand). In the following section, I 
outline the key features of those regimes and their development, and show that despite this 
fragmentation, there remains a key sense in which the various regimes continue to reflect their 
origins in the prerogative powers of the Crown.  
 
3. The legal bases of passports 
 
The law of passports in the UK remains essentially unreformed: though a range of ancillary 
statutory powers has been added, at their heart continues to stand a prerogative core. The 
situation persists notwithstanding several recommendations to amend it. In 1976, the British 
Section of the International Commission of Jurists issued a report examining legal questions 
around passports, recommending ‘as a basic constitutional necessity, the early enactment of a 
brief statute conferring upon all citizens the legal right to a passport.’42 Moreover, it concluded 
that ‘the right of movement is of such cardinal libertarian importance, and that the danger of 
                                                     
39 The Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946 was followed by the Commonwealth Conference on Nationality 
and Citizenship of February 1947 and the enactment of the British Nationality Act of 1948: see Jatinder 
Mann, ‘The evolution of Commonwealth citizenship, 1945–1948 in Canada, Britain and Australia’ (2012) 
50 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 293.  
40 See, at the relevant time, British Nationality Act 1948, s 1. The relevant legal category was that of 
‘citizens of the United Kingdom and the Colonies’. British subjects, whether CUKCs or Commonwealth 
citizens, enjoyed until the early 1960s what we would now call a right of abode in the United Kingdom: 
DPP v Bhagwan [1972] AC 60. That position was brought to an end by the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act 1962. 
41 Under the Australian Passport Act 1920. The category of British subject was not removed from 
Australian law until the enactment of the Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984. 
42 JUSTICE (n 37) [48]. 
unreviewable maladministration in the application of the four imprecise criteria for refusal is so 
great, that the right to a passport should be absolute.’43 Without denying that the executive might 
legitimately wish to prevent citizens from leaving the country, it argued that it should do so only 
‘by open and judicially-acknowledged means’, potentially by seeking to persuade a court to grant 
a writ of ne exeat regno, the persistence of which was at that point in time uncertain.44 Ultimately, 
however, no attempt was made to alter the legal underpinnings of passports: though a number of 
bills were introduced over the years, none made significant progress.45 The Government in its 
most recent statement of policy on its exercise of its powers in this area described the position as 
follows: 
 
There is no entitlement to a passport and no statutory right to have access to a passport. 
The decision to issue, withdraw, or refuse a British passport is at the discretion of the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (the Home Secretary) under the Royal 
Prerogative.46  
 
This might be a tolerable situation were the claims made by Wade – that a passport is ‘simply an 
administrative document’ which does not have ‘the slightest effect’ upon the legal rights of a UK 
national47 – valid. But, as noted above, that characterisation misleads: the possession of a 
passport effectively determines the enjoyment of the right to travel. It is therefore, to put the 
point briefly, unacceptable that those rights are given, and taken away, at the discretion of the 
Home Secretary. Some of the most important consequences of the legal position have, though, 
been ameliorated by developments elsewhere. Historical accounts of the prerogative included the 
claim – present in Blackstone – that the prerogative was an essentially arbitrary power: recourse 
for its misuse could only be political, never legal.48 The implications of this position – reflected in 
the proposition that though the courts were able to rule on the existence (and scope) of the 
prerogative, they could not review its exercise – were spelled out in Parliament in the late 1950s: 
the Minister, being probed about accountability for the withdrawal of passports, was asked 
whether he was implying ‘the only action open to one aggrieved would be in fact to defeat the 
                                                     
43 JUSTICE (n 37) [51]. 
44 JUSTICE (n 37) [55]. 
45 See Scott (n 18) 173-4. 
46 Theresa May, ‘The issuing, withdrawal or refusal of passports’, HC Deb 25 April 2013 vol 561 col 
68WS.  
47 Wade (n 35). 
48 Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 243-4. 
Government?’ His response was that was ‘a very difficult but not unknown process.’49 Against 
this background, William Wade and Bernard Schwartz once said that the power to refuse or 
cancel passports was ‘perhaps the only really objectionable arbitrary power which the Crown still 
claims’.50 The decision in the GCHQ case, according to which some facets of the prerogative 
could be subject to judicial review, provides a more practicable alternative to bringing down the 
government.51 The logic which in the GCHQ applied to the management of the Civil Service was 
held, in Everett,52 to encompass also passports, and so Wade and Schwartz’s claim no longer 
holds. 
 
As in the United Kingdom, the legal basis of passports in Canada continues to be the 
prerogative.53 Unlike the United Kingdom, however, the prerogative has been codified in law, 
and the relevant rules are now found in a piece of prerogative legislation – the Canadian 
Passports Order of 1981 – enacted by the Governor General in Council.54 The effect is that the 
Canadian regime sits somewhere between the ‘pure’ prerogative of the United Kingdom on one 
hand and the statutory regulation of passports in Australia and New Zealand on the other. The 
Order provides only that ‘any person who is a Canadian citizen under the Act may be issued a 
passport’55 and that ‘[n]o passport shall be issued to a person who is not a Canadian citizen under 
the Act.’56 It therefore creates a direct link between citizenship and passport, without going so far 
as to grant citizens an explicit right to a passport. And, though enacted under the prerogative, the 
Order does not exhaust the legal regulation of passports, but (now) explicitly provides that 
prerogative over passports is in no way limited or affected by it.57  
 
                                                     
49 HL Deb 16 June 1958, vol 209 col 862. 
50 B Schwartz and HWR Wade, Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States, 
Oxford University Press (1972) 63. 
51 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
52 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett [1989] QB 811.  
53 On which in Canada see Craig Forcese, ‘The Executive, The Royal Prerogative, and the Constitution’ in 
Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem, and Nathalie Des Rosiers, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution, 
Oxford University Press (2017). 
54 Previously, passports were regulated by the Canadian Passport Regulations, CRC, c 641. The 
regulations were made under the Department of External Affairs Act 1970, though Arkelian notes that 
‘[w]hether that statute, which nowhere provides in express terms either for regulations in general or for 
passport administration in particular, was adequate authority for the old Regulations was always dubious.’ 
A J Arkelian, ‘The Right to a Passport in Canadian Law’ (1983) 21 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 
284, 284 fn 2. 
55 Canadian Passports Order (SI/81-86) para 4(1) (emphasis added). 
56 SI/81-86, para 4(2). 
57 SI/81-86, para 4 (3). 
The Commonwealth of Australia, federated in 1901, began to directly regulate passports 
only following the outbreak of the First World War. It did so via regulations under the War 
Precautions Act 1914, intended in large part to prevent men of military age from leaving the 
country.58 These temporary restrictions were made permanent by the Passports Act 1920.59 The 
Passports Act 1938, the legislation which regulated the grant of passports form most of the 
twentieth century, replaced it for a variety of reasons: in part to address uncertainties as to the 
bases upon which a passport might be refused;60 in part in order to ‘bring Australian legislation 
into conformity with the ordinary conception of a passport’ articulated in the passage of Brailsford 
quoted above;61 and, imminently, to address the problem of Jewish refugees in the 
Commonwealth who would be unable to acquire a passport under the law as it then existed.62 
Into the twenty-first century, this remained the basic form of the statutory rule: a discretionary 
power possessed by the Minister rather than a right belonging to the individual citizen. Though 
the Passports (Amendment) Act 1979 made various changes,63 the aim being ‘to provide a 
proper legislative basis for the passport policy as well as a clear legislative framework for the 
exercise of ministerial discretion’, it left that discretion in place as ‘the cornerstone of the 
administration in the field’.64  
 
The 1938 Act was eventually superseded by the Australian Passports Act 2005, which 
replaced that discretion with a right, providing in section 7(1) that ‘[a]n Australian citizen is 
entitled, on application to the Minister, to be issued with an Australian passport by the Minister.’ 
That right is made subject to the need to prove citizenship and identity,65 and to the various 
grounds that are specified as justifying the refusal to issue an Australian passport.66 
Notwithstanding these carve outs, the Act, in creating a legal entitlement to a passport, comes 
closer than do the other jurisdictions under consideration to recognising the connection which 
exists between possession of passport and the ability to enter, remain in, and leave, the country 
                                                     
58 See Jane Doulman and David Lee, Every Assistance & Protection: A History of the Australian Passport, The 
Federation Press (2008), chapter 2. Essentially equivalent considerations have been identified as 
motivating the restrictions on travel which appear to have existed in mediaeval England: see the texts 
cited at n 5 above. 
59 See Doulman and Lee (n 58) chapter 3.  
60 Enacted largely in response to the judgment of the High Court of Australia in R v Paterson, ex parte 
Purves (1937) 10 ALJR 468; [1937] ALR 144, discussed below: see Doulman and Lee (n 58) chapter 4. 
61 Robert S Lancy, ‘The Evolution of Australian Passport Law’ (1982) 13 Melbourne University Law Review 
428, 439. 
62 Doulman and Lee (n 58) 119. 
63 On which see Gary Heilbronn, ‘New (and more restrictive) passports legislation’ (1980) 5 Legal Service 
Bulletin 225. 
64 Lancey (n 61) 443. 
65 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), s 7(2) and 8. 
66 APA 2005, s 7(2) and Division 2. 
of which one is a citizen. This substantive point augments those benefits which derive from the 
very form of the legal rules governing passports: that, being statutory in nature, the rules have an 
exhaustive quality that the UK and Canadian equivalents lack. They are also more likely, as a 
result of their form, to meet basic rule of law criteria such as stability and clarity.  
 
New Zealand began to regulate passports at much the same time as did Australia. 
Regulations made by Order in Council in 1916 – later continued in force by statute67 – required 
those over the age of 15 to provide a passport on arrival in New Zealand.68 The Passports Act 
1934 gave the rule a primary legislative basis, but without yet regulating the grant of passports by 
New Zealand itself. Such grant was first provided for by the Passports Act 1946, but – as in 
Australia – passports could be issued to any British subject.69 The current passport regimes is 
found in the Passports Act 1992, which provides that ‘[e]xcept as provided in this Act, every 
New Zealand citizen is entitled as of right to a New Zealand passport’70 and that, subject to 
specified exceptions, the most important of them discussed below, the relevant Minister ‘shall 
issue a New Zealand passport to every New Zealand citizen who makes an application, or on 
whose behalf an application is made, for a New Zealand passport.’71 The legal entitlement to a 
passport is therefore a strong one, and the discretion to deny a passport to a citizen very 
limited.72  
 
Despite the distinctive legal frameworks which now apply, however, passports in the 
Commonwealth still demonstrate the legacy of the ambiguous position they enjoy in the United 
Kingdom. That is, in none of the jurisdictions are they acknowledged as repositories of legal 
rights, but rather in each case effectively constituted as artefacts which facilitate the exercise of 
independently existing rights. This is mostly obviously true of Australia, in which no statute 
explicitly confers upon citizens the right of abode; not even one whose exercise is contingent 
                                                     
67 War Regulations Continuance Act 1920, s 4 and schedule 2. 
68 Additional War Regulations made by Order in Council (21 August 1916), regulations 3 and 4. The 
parent act was the War Regulations Act 1914. 
69 Passports Act 1946, s 3(1). New Zealand citizenship as a legal category was first created by the British 
Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948, later replaced by the Citizenship Act 1977. 
70 Passports Act 1992, s 3. 
71 PA 1992, s 4(1). 
72 All of the circumstances in which a passport might be refused create a discretion: PA 1992, ss 4(3). The 
only exception is where a court has made an order that a person must be issued to a person for a 
specified period. Where such an order is in force, the minister must not issue a passport to its subject: PA 
1992, s 4(4). 
upon the ability to produce proof of citizenship in the form (probably) of a passport.73 The rules 
are found in the Migration Act 1958, which requires both citizens and non-citizens entering 
Australia to clear immigration, meaning in the case of the citizen, inter alia, to present without 
unreasonable delay one’s ‘Australian passport or prescribed other evidence of the person’s 
identity and Australian citizenship’.74 As in the United Kingdom, therefore, the passport is made 
the primary (though not, at least in theory, exclusive) means by which an individual demonstrates 
an entitlement to enter the country: entering without a passport remains possible as a matter of 
law. Against this background, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (‘ASIO’), at 
whose behest the cancellation of passports on national security grounds will usually take place, 
has asserted that the right to enter the country is unaffected by the cancellation of a passport: 
 
The cancellation of a passport does not affect an Australian citizen’s right of return to 
Australia. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT) can issue temporary documents 
to facilitate the return of an Australian citizen whose passport has been cancelled while 
the holder is overseas.75 
 
This assertion relies on the same thin distinction between the existence of the right and its 
exercise which we have already called into question in the United Kingdom context. The 
cancellation of a passport does not as a matter of strict law, it is true, affect the right of return. It 
does, though, effectively prevent the exercise of that right: if it did not, there would be no need 
for the issue of temporary documents. Better, therefore, given the centrality of passports to the 
process by which the citizen enters Australia, to agree with Sangeetha Pillai’s conclusion that the 
various caveats to the general right to a passport in Australian law, together with the possibility 
of cancelling a passport once issued, effectively permit the citizen to be prevented not only from 
travelling abroad,76 but also from entering the country.77 The same evidential requirements as 
                                                     
73 Though Helen Irving has argued that the one true and absolute distinction between citizens and aliens 
is that the former, and not the latter, enjoy a right of abode which is ‘conceptually inseparable from 
citizenship’ and ‘embedded in the constitutional concept of citizenship.’ Citizens owe allegiance to the 
Commonwealth and, in return, Irving claims, they enjoy a right of abode: Helen Irving, ‘Still Call Australia 
Home: The Constitution and the Citizen’s Right of Abode’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 133, 141 and 150. 
74 Migration Act 1958, s 166. 
75 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIO Report to Parliament (2014-15), 21. See also Fabian 
Di Lizia, ‘More Than Just a Humble Abode: The Implications of Constitutional Citizenship Rights for 
Passport Law’ [2018] UWALR 30 116, 122-124. 
76 Sangeetha Pillai, ‘The Rights and Responsibilities of Australian Citizenship: A Legislative Analysis’ 
(2014) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 736, 760-1. 
77 ‘If a person’s passport is cancelled while they are overseas, the cancellation would, in a practical sense, 
deprive them of the capacity to re-enter Australia. This suggests that while regulation of the entry rights 
apply to entry into Australia as apply to departure from it, though here there is no obligation to 
present one’s passport (or ‘prescribed other evidence’ of identity and citizenship. Instead, a 
clearance officer may require its presentation.78  
 
In Canada, statute provides that ‘every person seeking to enter Canada must appear for 
an examination to determine whether that person has a right to enter Canada or is or may 
become authorized to enter and remain in Canada’.79 In addition, ‘[e]very Canadian citizen within 
the meaning of the Citizenship Act… has the right to enter and remain in Canada in accordance 
with this Act and an officer shall allow the person to enter Canada if satisfied following an 
examination on their entry that the person is a citizen or registered Indian.’80 A right of abode 
(though not under that name) is therefore explicitly granted but – as in the United Kingdom – 
can be enjoyed only subject to an examination aimed at establishing citizenship. Though the 
statute does not make it a prerequisite (and indeed says nothing about how exactly one might 
prove one’s identity and nationality) citizenship is likely to be established in the first place by 
producing a valid Canadian passport, creating the same link between passport and the exercise 
(though not the existence of) the right of abode as in the UK and Australia. In Canada, however, 
the right is more strongly protected than in the United Kingdom (where it takes statutory form, 
and so is as a matter of domestic law subject to legislative abrogation) and in Australia (where no 
such explicit right exists at all). The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides, in 
section 6(1), that ‘[e]very citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada’, 
adding to the citizen’s statutory rights a constitutional right to leave the country. These rights, 
like the other Charter rights, are ‘subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’81 Unlike most of the rights therein 
guaranteed, however, the right in section 6 cannot be displaced by a legislative declaration that 
some statute (or some provision thereof) is to operate ‘notwithstanding’ the inclusion of the 
right in question in the Charter.82 This provision increases the possible bases of a challenge to the 
refusal of a passport. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of non-citizens might be more common as a matter of everyday practice, citizens are not immunised 
through legislation against exclusion from Australian territory.’ Pillai (n 76) 761. 
78 Migration Act 1958, s 175(1)(a)(i). 
79 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s 18(1). 
80 IRPA, s 19(1). 
81 Constitution Act 1982 s 1. 
82 Constitution Act 1982 s 33(1). 
In New Zealand, finally, the Immigration Act 2009 provides that ‘every New Zealand 
citizen has, by virtue of his or her citizenship, the right to enter and be in New Zealand at any 
time’,83 but that ‘to establish his or her right to enter New Zealand, a New Zealand citizen must 
prove his or her citizenship and establish his or her identity by complying with border 
requirements.’84 Those requirements might be met before or upon entering New Zealand. In the 
form which apply to the latter scenario, the 2009 Act exempts – from the general duty to apply 
for entry permission – those persons who are New Zealand citizens who hold and produce a 
New Zealand passport, imposing on such persons the separate duty to ‘comply with any 
requirements prescribed for the purpose of confirming the person’s status as a New Zealand 
citizen.’85 Though the latter does not explicitly require the production of a passport, the fact that 
the former exempts only those who produce such a passport means that the New Zealand 
regime comes closer than do any of the others under consideration to making a passport a legal 
(rather than practical) precondition of entry into the country. Moreover, the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 provides for a right to freedom of movement. For present purpose, the key 
elements of that right are the assertion that ‘[e]very New Zealand citizen has the right to enter 
New Zealand’ and ‘[e]veryone has the right to leave New Zealand.’86 Like all of the rights 
asserted therein, these may be ‘subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’87 
 
4.  Passports and national security 
 
As a matter of law, therefore, all of the jurisdictions at issue decline to make the possession of a 
passport an express precondition of the possession of a right to travel, in effecting perpetuating 
the United Kingdom’s approach whereby a passport facilitates the exercise of a right whose 
existence is independent of it, protected by ‘ordinary’ law and, perhaps, a regime of fundamental 
rights protection. And yet each of the jurisdictions has in recent years made use of passports as a 
tool with which to protect the public interest generally, and that of national security specifically – 
an approach which is possible only because the practical reality differs from the formal legal 
position.  
 
                                                     
83 Immigration Act 2009, s 13(1). 
84 IA 2009, s 13(2). 
85 IA 2009, s 99(1). 
86 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 18(2) and (3). 
87 NZBORA 1990, s 5. 
In 1958, a statement made in the House of Lords by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, the Earl of Gosford, outlined the government’s position on how the 
power to refuse or withdraw passports would be used. Included was the category of ‘persons 
whose activities are so notoriously undesirable or dangerous that Parliament would be expected 
to support the action of the Foreign Secretary in refusing them a passport or withdrawing a 
passport already issued in order to prevent their leaving the United Kingdom.’88 In response to 
questioning the Earl noted that the process had been going on ‘for many years’ and that ‘[t]he 
number of passports withheld annually is one or, at the most, two, as against the many millions 
which are issued.’89 The number seems to have risen, however, through the 1960s and 70s, 
particularly in the context of the phenomenon of British mercenaries leaving to fight in conflicts 
in Africa.90 As this was happening, the criteria for the withdrawal of passports were being 
softened. A 1974 statement provided that passports might be withdrawn from those ‘past or 
proposed activities are so demonstrably undesirable that the grant or continued enjoyment of 
passport facilities would be contrary to the public interest.’91 Over time, however, the use of 
passports to this end appears to have tapered off, and it appears that no passports were 
withdrawn on these grounds in the entirety of the 1980s.  
 
The return of the power to prominence in all the jurisdictions at issue is a result, in the 
first place, of the new national security era brought about by the attacks of September 11 2001 
and, later, the emergence of the phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’. But in the United Kingdom, a 
more specific turning point appears to be the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in 2010 and the publication by it of an amended policy for the exercise of 
the withdrawal power in April 2013.92 The 2013 statement remains the authoritative guide to 
how the power might be used. For present purposes the key situation in which revocation or 
refusal might take place is in relation to ‘a person whose past, present or proposed activities, 
actual or suspected, are believed by the Home Secretary to be so undesirable that the grant or 
continued enjoyment of passport facilities is contrary to the public interest.’93 In the period 
thereafter for which statistics are available, the power was used to revoke a passport or to refuse 
                                                     
88 HL Deb 16 June 1958, vol 209 col 860. 
89 HL Deb 16 June 1958, vol 209 col 863. 
90 See Lord Diplock, Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to inquire into the recruitment of 
mercenaries, Cmnd 6569 (1976) and the discussion in Scott (n 18) 175-7. Lord Diplock had earlier produced 
an important consideration of the international law elements of passports: Kenneth Diplock, ‘Passports 
and Protection in International Law’ (1946) 32 Transactions of the Grotius Society 42. 
91 HC Deb 24 June 1974, vol 875 col 357W. Wade described this as ‘a polysyllabic way of describing any 
one whose activities are disapproved of by the government.’ HWR Wade (n 35) 63. 
92 May (n 46). 
93 May (n 46). As elsewhere, the decision to refuse or withdraw must be necessary and proportionate 
an application for one on national security grounds up to 24 times in a year in the following 
years.94  
 
There are therefore two notable elements to the modern British practice in this area: the 
first the reformulation of the grounds upon which revocation of a passport might take place, the 
second the increase in the use to which the power has been put. Though the former reflects the 
legal form of passports in the United Kingdom – the government being capable of unilaterally 
rewriting the policy – the latter does not: not only might a statutory power similarly have been 
used more frequently than in the past, but a statutory power might in fact have been used more 
frequently than has been the prerogative power, which the executive would seem incentivised to 
use carefully, so as not to draw attention to the weaknesses of the legal regime. Most 
fundamentally, however, this practice reflects the (trivially correct) belief that refusal or 
withdrawal of passports works to limit one’s ability to travel abroad. In recent case law, it has 
been repeatedly held that the cancellation of a passport represents an interference with EU law 
rights of free movement. At one point, the Government was poised to argue otherwise, but the 
court held that it was correct to drop that argument, for ‘the avowed aim of the cancellation was 
to make it very difficult for [the passport holder] to travel abroad, and it is clear that it would 
have that effect.’95 Despite the emphasis placed in Brailsford and Joyce on the question of 
protection, therefore, the modern practice of issuing (or otherwise) passports reflects instead the 
relationship between passports and the ability to travel abroad.  
 
In Australia, the Passports Amendment Act 1979 inserted new provisions into the 
Passports Act 1938 specifying – for the first time – circumstances in which a passport would not 
be issued and creating a discretionary power to cancel a passport where the Minister or an officer 
became ‘aware of circumstances which, if they had existed immediately before the passport was 
issued, may have, or would have prevented the issue of the passport’.96 One of the new specific 
grounds inserted permitted cancellation or refusal of a passport to a person where the Minister 
had formed the opinion ‘if an Australian passport were issued to the person, the person would 
be likely to engage in conduct outside Australia that might prejudice the security of, or disrupt 
public order in, a country other than Australia or would endanger the health or welfare of 
                                                     
94 HM Government, Transparency Report 2018: Disruptive and Investigatory Powers, Cm 9609 (2018), [5.5]. The 
power was used against six individuals in 2013, 24 in 2014, 23 in 2015, 17 in 2016 and 14 in 2017.  
95 R (MR) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 1622 (Admin), [15]–[16]. 
96 Passports Act 1938, s 8(1A). 
persons in a country other than Australia’97 and considered that ‘in the circumstances, action to 
prevent that person engaging in that conduct should be taken by way of not issuing an Australian 
passport to that person’.98  
 
The 1938 Act’s replacement, the Australian Passports Act 2005, widens out the category 
of persons who might instigate the refusal or cancellation of a passport. It was enacted shortly 
after the power had been employed in order to cancel the passport of Mamdouh Habib, a dual 
Australian and Egyptian national who was held in Guantanamo bay in the years following the 
September 11 attacks – one of 16 cancelled in the year to February 2005.99 A ‘competent 
authority’ may make a ‘refusal/cancellation request’ in relation to a person where that authority 
‘suspects on reasonable grounds’ that if a passport were to be issued to that person, ‘the person 
would be likely to engage in conduct that… might prejudice the security of Australia or a foreign 
country’100 or ‘might endanger the health or physical safety of other persons (whether in Australia 
or a foreign country)’ and ‘the person should be refused an Australian travel document in order 
to prevent the person from engaging in the conduct’.101 The new formulation therefore 
strengthened the link between the apprehended future conduct and the refusal of the passport, 
such that a passport cannot be refused where there is no logical or causal connection between 
the refusal and the ability to carry out the conduct in question.102 Moreover, the 2005 Act 
explicitly foresees that the security which might justify a refusal or cancellation is that not of 
Australia but of a foreign state. Where such a request is made, the Minster may refuse to issue a 
passport.103 One ‘competent authority’ for the purpose of the act is (now) the Director General 
                                                     
97 Passports Act 1938, s 7E(1)(a). 
98 Passports Act 1938, s 7E(1)(b). 
99 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives, 14 February 2005, 24 
(Alexander Downer). 
100 In relation to the latter, see the discussion by Jake Blight of the Office of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security: ‘In the Passports Act you can cancel a passport on two grounds: either it is 
something that might prejudice the security of Australia, in which case the recommendation needs to 
come from a person—a specific individual such as the Director-General: or currently, if the minister was 
inclined to suspend a passport on the ground that it could prejudice security of a foreign country, if you 
scroll through the various options there is an option for a non-corporate Commonwealth entity to make 
that recommendation. So it is a little obscure but there is a way—if it was about a foreign country, not 
about Australia’s security—someone could ask ASIO the entity for a recommendation.’ Commonwealth 
of Australia, Official Committee Hansard: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Counter-
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, 2 October 2014, 5-6. 
101 Australian Passports Act 2005, s.14(1). On the interpretation of that phrase, see BLBS v Director-General 
of Security [2013] AATA 820, [77]-[85]. 
102 BLBS v Director-General of Security [2013] AATA 820, [86]. 
103 Since 2014 there has existed a separate power to suspend a passport for up to 14 days at the request of 
the Director-General of Security, where it is suspected that the person may leave Australia ‘to engage in 
conduct which might prejudice the security of Australia or a foreign country’ and the person’s travel 
documents should be suspended to prevent the conduct in question; APA 2005, s 22A(2)(a). The creation 
of ASIO, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation,104 which is empowered by statute to 
provide security assessments.105 ASIO figures show that the number of passports subject to 
adverse security assessments has risen from less than ten in the years 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-
12, to 93 in the year 2014-15,106 and then falling to 62 in 2015-16, ‘largely due to fewer 
Australians seeking to travel to conflicts in Syria and Iraq’.107 In March 2017 the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs – Julie Bishop – told the House of Representatives that she had, since September 
2014, cancelled 165 passports on national security grounds, and suspended 36 more.108 Almost a 
year later, she told the House that she had as Foreign Minister ‘cancelled the passports of about 
230 Australians who we believe pose a national security threat and were seeking to join the 
terrorist organisation ISIS or affiliates in the Middle East.’109 The Counter‑Terrorism (Temporary 
Exclusion Orders) Act 2019 provides another means by which restrictions on the possession of 
an Australian passport might be imposed.110 
 
The (New Zealand) Passports Act 1980 made provision for the refusal of a passport or 
its recall (and possible cancellation), but none of the specified grounds related directly to 
security.111 The position under its successor, the Passports Act 1992, has developed over time. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the power was recommended by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor: Brett Walker 
SC, Annual Report, 28 March 2014, 46-8.  
104 Australian Passports Determination 2015 s 14(2)(a) 
105 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, s 37(1).  
106 ASIO, Report to Parliament 2014-15 (2015), 22 (table 1). 
107 ASIO, Report to Parliament 2015-16 (2016), 50-51. Subsequent report to not provide equivalent figures. 
108 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives (1 March 2017) 1954. One 
cancellation in particular has been the source of controversy in Australia. In 2006, Australia and Timor-
Leste signed a treaty reflecting the need to update international agreements in light of Timor-Leste’s 
independence, achieved in 2002. In 2012 it was revealed by a whistleblower within the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service (known as ‘Witness K’) that ASIS had installed listening devices in the premises of 
Timor-Leste’s government in order to acquire an advantage in negotiations. Timor-Leste initially sought 
to have the Treaty nullified by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, though the case was later dropped. At 
the domestic level, however, there were two key responses. One was the raid, by ASIO, of the Australian 
lawyer acting for East Timor. The other was the cancellation Witness K’s passport, alleged by some to be 
an attempt to prevent him giving evidence in the case against Australia. In 2016 the Foreign Minister 
refused to issue Witness K a new passport on the grounds that a competent authority suspected that ‘if an 
Australian passport were issued to you, you would be likely to engage in conduct that might prejudice the 
security of Australia’, though it was unclear which was the authority in question: See Bernard Collaery, 
‘National security, legal professional privilege, and the Bar Rules’, Address at the Australian National 
University (11 June 2015). ASIS is not permitted to collect information on persons in Australian territory 
and ASIO, its domestic counterpart, had suggested to Witness K that it had no objection to his 
possessing a passport: Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard: Senate, Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Legislation Committee (1 June 2017), 31-2. 
109 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives (27 February 2018), 2067.  
110 Counter‑Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Act 2019, s 10(6). The Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security recommended that  
111 Passports Act 1980, s 4(2). 
Originally, it provided for neither refusal nor cancellation on grounds directly related to 
security,112 though provision was made for requiring the surrender of a passport by a person of 
whom the Minister intended to make an order depriving citizenship.113 Only with the Passports 
Amendment Act 2005 were powers of cancellation and refusal made available.114 Most of these 
changes to the 1992 Act have, however, now been overtaken by those made by the Intelligence 
and Security Act 2017, which creates a single, broader, power to refuse or recall (and then cancel 
or retain) a passport.115 This power in the first place replicates that introduced a decade earlier, 
applying where it is reasonably believed that a person is a danger to the security of New Zealand 
on one of three grounds, and subject to what are effectively requirements of necessity and 
proportionality: the relevant action (be it refusal or cancellation) will be effective in impeding the 
person’s ability to carry out the relevant activities, and the danger cannot be effectively averted 
by other forms of action.116 A second – and new – power, however, permits the same actions, 
where the Minister has reasonable cause to believe that a person is a danger to the security not of 
New Zealand, but to another country,117 with the relevant forms of danger more limited than 
                                                     
112 Passports Act 1992, s 4(3) and 8. 
113 PA 1992, s 12. 
114 Passport Act 1992, s 4A, as inserted by the Passports Amendment Act 2005. In each case the specific 
grounds were the same: the Minister believed on reasonable grounds that the person was a danger to the 
security of New Zealand because he intended to engage in or facilitate one of three types of activity, the 
danger to New Zealand could not be averted effectively by other means, and the refusal or cancellation 
would ‘prevent or effectively impede’ the person’s ability to carry out the relevant activity. The three 
activities in question were: ‘a terrorist act within the meaning of section 5 of the Terrorism Suppression 
Act 2002’; ‘the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’; and ‘any unlawful activity designed or likely 
to cause devastating or serious economic damage to New Zealand, carried out for purposes of 
commercial or economic gain’: PA 1992, s 4A(1)(a). A further relevant provision was inserted into the 
1992 Act by the Passports Amendment Act 2015, providing that – in relation to a number of cancellation 
powers, amongst them that relating to security – the Minister may cancel a New Zealand passport or 
other travel document ‘by electronically recording the cancellation… on a New Zealand travel document 
database’: Passports Act 1992, s 27I(1), as inserted by the Passports Amendment Act 2015. The 2015 Act 
was spun out of the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill of 2014. In its report on the 2014 Bill, 
the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee noted confusion which had arisen as regards 
passports: ‘We would like to address two concerns raised by a number of submitters regarding the effect 
of denial of a passport. The first is that where the passport of a person outside New Zealand is denied or 
cancelled the person concerned might be stranded with no way home. This is not the case; in this 
situation the Minister must upon application issue a journey-specific emergency travel document to the 
person so they could re-enter New Zealand. The second concern is that the denial of a passport would 
render a person ‘Stateless’. This is also not the case; denial of a passport affects only a person’s freedom 
to travel, it does not affect their nationality or citizenship.’ Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee, Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill - Government Bill (1-2) (2 December 2014), 3. 
115 Some provisions of the 2017 Act make permanent earlier, temporary, rules originally inserted in the 
1992 Act by the Passports Amendment Act 2014. 
116 PA 1992, s 27GA(1). 
117 PA 1992, s 27GA(2). 
apply where the security at issue is that of New Zealand.118 Though the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service has acknowledged in the past that it has recommended the cancellation of 
passports ‘of a number of individuals who had expressed intent to travel to the Middle East for 
the purposes of joining terrorist organisations such as Al Qa’ida’119 it did not give precise figures. 
Figures given by the Department of Internal Affairs (in recent years only) show the following 
pattern: 1 use of the national security power in 2014-15,120 5 in 2015-16,121 2 in 2016-17,122 and 
none in 2017-18 or 2018-19.123 One case in particular has attracted significant public attention: 
that of a New Zealand citizen living in Melbourne, Australia, whose passport was cancelled on 
international security grounds (being, that is, a threat to a country other than New Zealand) and 
has repeatedly – and so far unsuccessfully – sought to challenge the decision.124 
 
Well into the post-9/11 era, the Order regulating passports in Canada did not explicitly 
provide for the withdrawal or refusal of passports on security grounds. The point was 
highlighted by Khadr v Canada.125 The applicant, a Canadian citizen, had been detained in 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay before being released and taken to Bosnia, from where he 
sought to return to Canada. Based, apparently, on concerns about Canada-US relations, he was 
refused a passport. Two problems with that refusal were addressed in subsequent litigation. The 
first was that the refusal was the Minister’s, yet the Order – as it then stood – empowered only 
the Passport Office to refuse passports, not reserving any power to the Minister. The second was 
that the Passport Order – again, as it then stood – contained a seemingly exhaustive list of 
grounds upon which refusal might be happen: that list did not reference national security and 
none of the stated grounds were applicable. Deciding the case, the Federal Court held that the 
prerogative was not exhausted by the Passport Order, the rules which have emerged to regulate 
the relationship between prerogative and statute being of no application in a case where there 
                                                     
118 Though the ‘terrorist act’ and weapons of mass destruction grounds are included, that of ‘other 
unlawful activity designed or likely to cause serious economic damage’ and which is ‘carried out for the 
purpose of commercial or economic gain’ is excluded.  
119 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2014, G. 35 (2014), 4-
5. At 10, the report noted that ‘[b]y preventing these individuals travelling to engage in violent extremism, 
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120 Department of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 2014-15, G.7 (2015), 166. 
121 Department of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 2015-16, G.7 (2016), 166. 
122 Department of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, G.7 (2017), 183. 
123 Department of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 2017-18, G.7 (2018), 185 and Annual Report 2018-19, 
(2019), 188. 
124 See A v Minister of Internal Affairs [2017] NZHC 746, and Andrew Geddis, ‘The bizarre case of the NZ 
court case hidden from public and media scrutiny’, The Spinoff (2 March 2018). 
125 Khadr v Canada (Attorney General) 2006 FC 727  
was no statute in play.126 It also held, however, that the applicant had a legitimate expectation as 
to the criteria which would be employed in determining his passport application. That 
expectation was not met here. The court concluded its consideration of the issue by saying that 
‘[i]n the interests of the protection of national security and the very legitimate public interest in 
countering terrorism and other threats, a nation which has as a core principle that of the rule of 
law, must still adhere to the very legal principles that it seeks to protect.’127 
 
The lacuna identified in Khadr had been filled by the time judgment was given. On 1 
September 2004 the Governor General in Council amended the Passport Order to state that the 
Order did not limit the royal prerogative over passports and to provide that ‘the Minister may 
refuse or revoke a passport if the Minister is of the opinion that such action is necessary for the 
national security of Canada or another country.’128 This provision was amended in 2015 and now 
reads as follows: 
 
Without limiting the generality of subsections 4(3) and (4) and for greater certainty, the 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness may decide that a passport is not 
to be issued or is to be revoked if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
decision is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence, as defined in 
section 2 of the Criminal Code, or for the national security of Canada or a foreign 
country or state.129 
 
There remains the question of whether revocation or withdrawal might take place on other 
grounds than those specified. Though the provision is expressly without prejudice to the 
passport prerogative (which is now, unlike in the version at issue in Khadr, explicitly preserved) 
the reasoning of the court in Khadr would seem to retain some force. An individual who applies 
for, or possesses a passport, should be able to rely upon the content of the Order as to what 
activities might lead to his passport being refused or withdrawn. The attempt to preserve 
executive discretion is more problematic here than in the British context, in which the non-
statutory status of the applicable policy as to how the prerogative will be exercised as regards 
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passports makes it less reasonable to think that one might be able to rely on it to be exhaustive, 
stable, and prospective. Despite being less of a challenge to the rule of law in a general sense, the 
Canadian situation is, in this particular fashion, a threat to it, exemplifying a problem which can 
only exist where there is an underlying prerogative layer.  
 
The power appears to have been used with a degree of frequency in the modern 
context,130 but the Canadian authorities have argued that it is inadequate to address the problem 
of ‘foreign fighters’: 
 
…passport revocation is a potentially critical tool in dealing with foreign fighters. Why it 
is not a sufficient tool is a matter of speculation. The answer may be, simply, that 
passport revocation may make a ‘prison’ of Canada, but that prison is not sufficiently 
confined to comfort security officials. Put another way, enough people may have slipped 
from Canada that revocation has proven ineffectual. Alternatively, if deterred from 
travelling, a person may be redirected at domestic terrorism…131   
  
Long before the modern national security era, it was argued that, by virtue of the necessity of a 
passport to the exercise of a right to travel, the fact that the passport regime was based on 
absolute discretion and so able to be administered arbitrarily, the absence of a legal right to a 
passport and the lack of legal redress available to the citizen, ‘the existing passport regime is 
unconstitutional and should be replaced by a new regime that would remove passports forever 
from the realm of prerogative.’132 The fact that – post-Khadr – the executive was able to 
unilaterally rewrite the order in order to further its national security ends and to retrospectively 
reserve to itself a power to exercise the prerogative which the Passport Order had not previously 
contained suggests this point remains true. As in the United Kingdom, the case in favour of 
statutory regulation of passports is compelling, particularly when added to the issue of the 
problematic relationship between the possession and the exercise of the right to travel. As the 
Australian example shows, however, introducing a statutory regime does not by itself resolve this 
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tension, which will always persist while the true nature of a passport as an effective repository of 
rights is denied.  
 
5. From protection to the right to travel 
 
The legal effect of passports in the common law world has, we have seen, shifted over time. 
Where once passports derived their significance by demonstrating the protection owed by the 
Crown to the subject (or to a friendly alien in temporary allegiance thereto), passports’ primary 
significance is now owed instead to their implications for the right to travel. As seen in the 
previous section, they have in each of the relevant jurisdictions been operationalised in a fashion 
to which this shift is vital. But the legal frameworks which apply have not kept pace, failing in 
almost all cases to make plain the relationship between passports and the right to travel, and so 
to protect to an appropriate degree the individual’s right to a passport. New Zealand is an 
outlier: it comes closest to recognising the inherent (rather than merely contingent) link between 
passports and the right to travel and, in turn, possesses a law of passports which, in both form 
and substance, reflects an ideal to which the other states under discussion should look. 
 
This unwillingness to recognise explicitly the link between passports and the right to 
travel – to insist that while passports facilitate the exercise of the right, they do not confer it (and 
so their withdrawal does not affect that right) – has implications for the law of passports in the 
UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, including the grounds upon which decisions relating to 
passports can be challenged. Those implications are greatest for the jurisdictions – the UK and 
Canada – in which passports continue to be regulated as an aspect of the prerogative, for once 
we accept that the withdrawal of a passport represents an interference with the right to travel, we 
see that what is taking place is the use of the prerogative to limit a statutory right. In the United 
Kingdom, we noted above, the Immigration Act 1971 provides that all citizens enjoy the right of 
abode and that all persons who possess that right shall be free ‘to come and go into and from, 
the United Kingdom without let or hindrance’. When one is refused a passport, or one’s 
passport is withdrawn, the right is being interfered with, and though the 1971 Act caveats that 
rights by providing ‘except such as may be required under and in accordance with this Act to 
enable their right to be established or as may be otherwise lawfully imposed on any person’ the 
withdrawal of a passport cannot be lawful under either of these headings. Passing the checks 
under the 1971 Act requires, in practice, that one possesses a passport, while the imposition of 
new hurdles cannot be lawful if done under the prerogative, whose subordination to statute is 
well established in law and practice. As we have seen above, the courts have accepted in other 
contexts that the withdrawal of a passport does interfere with the right to travel. There can be no 
reason that what was true in that case of EU law would not also be true of the domestic law right 
of abode. While the 1971 Act preserves the prerogative, it does not do so generally but only in 
relation to ‘aliens’ and so what is thereby preserved cannot be used to interfere with the rights of 
subjects. The use of the passport prerogative to regulate entry and exit from the United 
Kingdom is therefore, in a modern context in which passports’ legal effect relates to the 
individual’s right to travel, unlawful.133  
 
What is true of the United Kingdom is, however, equally true of Canada, where the 
prerogative remains the basis of the law of passports, albeit in the form of prerogative 
legislation.134 When a passport is withdrawn on the basis of that authority the logic of the United 
Kingdom context applies equally: a prerogative power is unlawfully being used to interfere with a 
right protected not only by statute but also by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.135 The power 
to grant passports was addressed in Black v Chrétien,136 where the applicant had sued the Prime 
Minister and the Government of Canada on a variety of grounds arising out of his belief that the 
Prime Minister had unlawfully advised the Queen not to grant him a life peerage (in anticipation 
of which he had acquired British citizenship) because the Prime Minister had ‘not been kindly 
treated’ by a newspaper owned by the applicant.137 Laskin JA, giving the judgment of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, was required to decide whether the prerogative power in question was 
reviewable. Concluding that it was not, he adopted the approach of the House of Lords in 
GCHQ: what mattered was the subject of a power rather than its source and whether that subject 
was justiciable. He contrasted the honours prerogative (at the non-justiciable end of the 
spectrum) with those which lay at the other end of the spectrum, including the grant of 
passports:  
 
A passport is the property of the Government of Canada, and no person, strictly 
speaking, has a legal right to one. However, common sense dictates that a refusal to issue 
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a passport for improper reasons or without affording the applicant procedural fairness 
should be judicially reviewable.138 
 
Citing liberally from the decision of the High Court in Everett, he added that: 
 
In today’s world, the granting of a passport is not a favour bestowed on a citizen by the 
state. It is not a privilege or a luxury but a necessity. Possession of a passport offers 
citizens the freedom to travel and to earn a livelihood in the global economy. In Canada, 
the refusal to issue a passport brings into play Charter considerations; the guarantee of 
mobility under s. 6 and perhaps even the right to liberty under s. 7. In my view, the 
improper refusal of a passport should, as the English courts have held, be judicially 
reviewable.139 
 
Many challenges to acts relating to passports proceed on exactly these bases. In Kamel v Canada it 
was argued that the refusal to grant the applicant a passport breached the requirements of 
procedural fairness and that it violated sections 6, 7 and 15 of the Charter.140 In the Federal 
Court, Noël J allowed the application in part. For present purposes, his treatment of the section 
6 issue is key. The Attorney General had argued that section 6(1) was ‘limited to guaranteeing 
citizens the right to enter and leave, and that it [was] intended, for example, to prohibit 
banishment or exile, or preventing citizens from leaving Canada’ and that it did not require the 
Government to facilitate foreign travel.141 Moreover, a passport was not necessary for citizen to 
leave or enter Canada because in order to exercise those rights it was sufficient for an individual 
to offer proof of citizenship.142 In rejecting this, the Federal Court took a practical approach, 
treating a passport as ‘an essential tool to which Canadian citizens must have access in order to 
exercise their mobility rights outside Canada as guaranteed by the Charter’ and so held that 
refusal to issue a passport is an interference with the individual’s section 6(1) mobility rights.143 It 
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is not therefore open to argue that the right to travel is not limited or impinged by the refusal or 
withdrawal of a passport.144  
 
In the Charter context, the dispositive question therefore becomes whether the 
interferences is justified according to the criteria of section 1, which makes the rights subject to 
‘such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.’145 At first instance, Noël J held that these criteria were not fulfilled because 
the limits imposed by the passport order were not ‘prescribed by law’ in the relevant sense of 
that requirement: though the Passport Order was suitably accessible, it was vague and 
overbroad.146 On appeal, however, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the provision in 
question was not unconstitutionally vague. The wording ‘is necessary’ provided, as required, the 
basis for a legal debate, framing and limiting the discretion of the decision-maker.147 Moreover, in 
light of an earlier finding by Canadian Supreme Court that ‘danger to the security of Canada’ was 
suitably precise as to give ‘those who might come within the ambit of the provision fair notice of 
the consequences of their conduct, while adequately limiting law enforcement discretion,’148 the 
Passport Order, which adds a requirement of necessity and so ‘introduces the requirement of a 
causal connection between national security and the refusal to issue a passport,’  must clearly be 
similarly precise for the purpose of justifying an interference with the Charter right at issue.149 
Because the requirement of proportionality was also met, the Order was held to be compatible 
with the Charter.150  
 
To be successful on section 6 grounds, a challenge to the refusal or withdrawal of a 
passport must therefore show either that the requirements of the Passport Order were not met 
in a particular case or that, notwithstanding the basic compatibility of that Order with the 
Charter, a particular decision under it was incompatible. This latter point was made in Abdelrazik 
v Canada,151 which confirms first of all the converse of the point in Khadr and Kamel – that 
because a passport is necessary for the practical exercise of one’s Charter rights, the Government 
of Canada is under a positive obligation to issue an emergency passport to a citizen outside 
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Canada. Failure to do so must be justified according to the same Charter criteria as apply to the 
refusal or withdrawal of a passport. The applicant was Canadian-Sudanese and had travelled to 
Sudan and been detained there, his passport expiring during the period of detention. He later 
sought shelter in the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum where he made repeated attempts to 
acquire a passport or other travel document which would allow him to return home. Though he 
was not successful, no order was made under the Passports Order, with the Canadian 
government instead providing a number of (sometimes inaccurate) reasons for not issuing an 
emergency passport. In holding that there was no justification for the interference with 
Abdelrazik’s section 6 rights, the Federal Court held that to refuse a passport to a citizen abroad 
(and so to prevent a citizen returning to Canada, as is his right under the Charter) would require 
that it be shown that not only there is a risk to national security if an individual returns to 
Canada, but that the risk is greater than that the citizen poses when situated abroad: ‘[i]f he poses 
no greater risk, what justification can there be for breaching the Charter by refusing him to 
return home; especially where, as here, the alternative is to effectively exile the citizen to live the 
remainder of his life in the Canadian embassy abroad.’152 The Minister having failed to show any 
such thing, Abdelrazik’s section 6 rights had been violated, and he was entitled to a remedy that 
would put him in the position in which he would have been if not for the violation of his Charter 
rights, which required, in the first place, that he be provided with an emergency passport.  
 
On the flipside, when Kamel’s case returned to the Federal Court following the refusal of 
his renewed request for a passport, the interference with his section 6 rights was held to be 
justified. Relevant to that conclusion was the time-limited nature of the refusal (which the 
Minister stated would apply only for five years) and the ongoing possibility of the applying for a 
limited validity passport on urgent or compassionate grounds, both of which ‘show that the 
applicant’s rights are, to a certain extent, being weighed against the aim of the legislation’153 and 
ensure that the infringement ‘cannot be characterised as final and irrevocable’.154 When its 
processes are followed and its provisions adhered to, the Passport Order therefore shows itself 
to be entirely capable of advancing the national security objectives in pursuit of which passports 
have come to be operationalised, and in a fashion which is assuredly constitutional. These 
questions, however, about the quality of the norm and issues of necessity and proportionality, are 
logically posterior to the sorts of questions which are raised most directly by the recognition of 
the nexus between passports and the right to travel. That is, the more fundamental issue is that 
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when a passport is refused or withdrawn under the Order, a prerogative power is being used to 
limit a right recognised explicitly in statute: it is therefore, according to well-established principles 
of the common law, unlawful notwithstanding the objective necessity, or the contingent 
proportionality, of the limitation.  
 
Though the implications of the link between passports and the right to travel are greatest 
where passports remain an aspect of the prerogative, that link is significant also in the other 
jurisdictions under consideration. We have already noted, for example that in both jurisdictions 
in which passports are governed by a statute, there is an explicit legal right to a passport which is 
absent in prerogative states. There are also variations in the standard of review which applies to 
passport decisions and it is perhaps unsurprising that the jurisdiction – New Zealand – which 
comes closest to recognising the centrality of passports to the right to travel is that in which 
passport decisions are most closely scrutinised by courts. When the power to cancel a passport 
was introduced in New Zealand, it was accompanied by a right of appeal to the High Court,155 
which could ‘confirm, modify, or quash the decision that is the subject of the appeal’156 and, 
where the appeal related ‘to a matter within the discretion of the Minister’ was empowered to 
‘substitute its own discretion for that of the Minister.’157 The right of appeal in the Passports Act 
1992 shares the essential features of that provision.158 Though its core has remained stable, the 
introduction of powers to cancel passports on, first, national and, later, international security 
grounds has seen a special regime introduced to govern situations in which the decision is based 
upon sensitive material.159 In appeals against specified categories of decision, the court must 
determine whether ‘the information that led to the decision is credible, having regard to its 
source or sources’, as well as whether it supports the relevant finding.160  
 
Though there is – presumably as a result of the small numbers of passport cancellations 
on national security grounds – little litigation in which substantive challenges to cancellation have 
been determined,161 we have available the Attorney-General’s statements as to the compatibility 
of some of the relevant legislation with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. In relation to both 
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of the Passports Amendment Acts 2014 and 2015, it was accepted that provisions relating to the 
cancellation of passports were prima facie incompatible with the right, found in section 18 of the 
Bill of Rights Act, to freedom of movement, but it was argued that the provisions were 
nevertheless justifiable in accordance with its section 5, which permits ‘such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’162 To be 
justified under this provision, a limit must serve a sufficiently important purpose, and must pass 
a proportionality assessment. This latter requires a rational connection between the limit and the 
objective, that the limit does not impair the right in question more than is reasonably necessary 
for sufficient achievement of the objective, and that the limit is in due proportion to the 
importance of that objective.163 From the point of view of the specific right to enter New 
Zealand, both of the assessments emphasise the existence in the 1992 Act of a duty to supply a 
‘journey-specific emergency travel document’ to a person who has been refused a passport, or 
seen his or her passport cancelled, on national security grounds, where ‘the journey-specific 
emergency travel document is necessary to enable the person to return or come to New 
Zealand’.164  
 
The existence of this provision does two things. First, it demonstrates once again that the 
link between a passport and the right to travel is effectively absolute, such that where a passport 
is cancelled that right can be exercised only by a person in possession of a passport substitute. 
Second, and conversely, it highlights that the absence of an equivalent provision as regards the 
right to leave New Zealand demonstrates that the cancellation of a passport can in practice be 
used to impose an absolute (if temporary) bar on the exercise of the right to travel in the form of 
the right to exit the state. These points were made in relation to the Bill which became the New 
Zealand Intelligence and Security Act 2017: 
 
The travel restrictions serve a significant and important objective, namely disrupting the 
movement of foreign terrorist fighters (‘FTFs’) and other persons who may pose a 
serious risk to national security… The suspension or cancellation of travel documents is 
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rationally connected to this objective. We also consider the safeguards in the Bill mean 
the right is limited no more than reasonably necessary.165  
 
Citing to one of the Canadian cases discussed above, the document accepted, correctly, that 
‘[t]he right of a citizen to enter New Zealand is illusory without the positive obligation on the 
Minister to issue an emergency travel document.’166 Though no court seems yet to have ruled on 
the specific question of the compatibility of the national security cancellation power with the Bill 
of Rights Act, it is likely – by analogy with the foreign jurisprudence considered above – that 
they will at the relevant time agree with this assessment in any cases brought before it. 
 
This account might be contrasted with the position in Australia, where an individual may 
apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for review of decisions made by a 
Minister,167 including the decisions to refuse or to cancel passports.168 Also reviewable is the 
making (by ASIO) of the adverse security assessment which results in the refusal or cancellation 
of a passport,169 though at times challenges to the refusal/cancellation will challenge also the 
underlying security assessment, with the Minister’s decision standing or falling on the strength of 
the that assessment.170 The AAT’s range of options can be and often will be, however, curtailed 
in the passports context: the Australian Passports Act permits the Minister to certify, in respect 
of a decision made under the provision of that statute which allows an authority to request a 
passport refusal/cancellation request on security grounds, that the decision ‘involved matters of 
international relations or criminal intelligence.’171 In such a case the AAT may only make either a 
decision affirming the Minister’s decision vis a vis the passport, or one ‘remitting the decision to 
the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the 
Tribunal.’172 National security concerns therefore – assuming, as is almost certainly the case, that 
they can be legitimately subsumed into the headings of ‘international relations’ or ‘criminal 
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intelligence’ – come to be reflected not only in the effective standard of review employed in 
reviewing the decision itself made in pursuit of national security but also in the remedy which 
might be granted.  
 
Where the making of an adverse security assessment can be challenged only by way of 
review in the AAT, the decision to refuse a passport can be the subject of judicial review 
proceedings. The approach to the review may differ as between the two decisions at issue in 
national security cases. In BLBS v Director-General of Security,173 it was held that, in light of the fact 
that the ASIO Act ‘makes an exception to the principle that liberty is not a gift of the 
government but a right of the governed’, that ASIO is ‘entitled to make an adverse assessment 
only if it possesses such relevant and probative material as a reasonable mind would accept to be 
adequate to support the conclusion(s) arrived at.’174 Nevertheless, the review is not, despite the 
identity of the body under review and the nature of the decision made, a mere rubber-stamp. It 
was argued in BLBS that, in regard to the making of the adverse security assessment, the AAT 
should defer to the judgment of ASIO and its officers. That submission was rejected with 
reference to the distinctive procedure employed in the AAT when such assessments are being 
reviewed.175 If, the Tribunal said, the tribunal was – alongside those special procedures and the 
disadvantage at which they place the applicant – to agree to ‘defer to the opinions, findings and 
assessments of the staff of the Organisation whose decisions it is charged with reviewing, the 
Tribunal’s function would be devalued and its credibility could not be maintained.’176 In 
reviewing a security assessment, the Security Division may make findings which supersede an 
assessment only if the information being superseded is, in the Tribunal’s opinion, ‘incorrect, is 
incorrectly represented or could not reasonably be relevant to the requirements of security.’177 
Though there is little case law in the Australian context, it has been argued that – by analogy with 
Abdelrazik – a constitutional right of abode should be recognised in Australia and that such a 
right is likely to be breached by ‘certain passport decisions’, which the Australian Passports Act 
should therefore be read down ‘so as not to authorise’.178 
 
6. Conclusions 
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The law of passports does not generally attract attention commensurate with the importance of 
passports to the rights of the individual. Where once passports were documentary evidence of 
the relationship between the allegiance owed to the Crown and the protection owed to it in 
return by the individual, that link has been weakened if not broken entirely. The correlative 
relationship between allegiance and protection is a weak one, a function of subjecthood or 
citizenship to which the possession of a passport is – notwithstanding the decision of the House 
of Lords in Joyce – neither here nor there. Instead in a world in which the right to enter and exit 
states is heavily regulated – something that only became true around a century ago – passports 
are intimately tied to the right to travel. The specific nature of the link, however, remains 
deliberately ambiguous. As a matter of law, the Commonwealth states considered here have been 
unwilling to break entirely from the British approach, whereby a passport facilitates the exercise 
of the right to travel but the grant of a passport does not confer that right, and its withdrawal 
does not therefore extinguish it. This claim, which allowed William Wade to assert the legal 
emptiness of passports, relies upon a distinction between legal and practical reality which is 
misleading, distorting the picture in a fashion likely to result in weaker protection for the 
individual’s rights. That the true position has often been recognised – implicitly or explicitly – in 
litigation arising out of the use of passports as a tool of national security is therefore welcome, 
but the full implications of that position have yet to make themselves felt.  
